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“JUVENILES ARE DIFFERENT”: EASIER SAID THAN DONE  
RESOLVING DISPARITIES AMONG COURTS REGARDING 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SENTENCING JUVENILES TO 
DE FACTO LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE  
Audrey Fernandez* 
ABSTRACT 
This comment addresses the Eighth Amendment violation inherent in 
sentencing juvenile offenders to a lengthy term of years constituting a de 
facto life-without-parole (LWOP) sentence. The Supreme Court has held that 
the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits sentencing juvenile offenders 
to the death penalty, LWOP for non-homicide offenses, and mandatory 
LWOP for homicide offenses. Recently, the Court granted certiorari in the 
case of Mathena v. Malvo to determine whether the Court’s precedent can be 
used to upend discretionary life-without-parole sentences. However, circuit 
courts remain divided on the issue of whether a de facto LWOP sentence 
violates the Eighth Amendment. This comment argues that the reason for the 
divide lies in the sentencing courts’ inability to fully appreciate and 
implement the Court’s juvenile sentencing precedent and the reasoning 
behind those holdings. In an effort to resolve the discord among lower courts 
on the issue of de facto LWOP, this note proposes recommendations aimed 
at bridging the gap between Supreme Court case law and federal sentencing 
factors and guidelines.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The American criminal justice system recognizes a fundamental 
difference between adult and juvenile offenders for sentencing purposes.1 As 
compared to adults, juveniles—including those who have committed terrible 
crimes—lack maturity, are vulnerable to negative influences, and have a 
greater capacity for rehabilitation.2 These differences present Eighth 
Amendment proportionality concerns in instances where juveniles face the 
possibility of receiving the harshest possible sentences, typically imposed on 
offenders who are all morally culpable and irreparably corrupt.3 The Supreme 
Court has held that the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and 
unusual punishment categorically prohibits sentencing juvenile offenders to 
the death penalty,4 life without parole (LWOP) for non-homicide offenses,5 
 
* J.D. 2020, Florida International University College of Law. I would like to thank my parents, 
Odalys and Juan Carlos, for always reminding me that gold has a price, but an education is priceless. I 
would also like to thank Professor Rima Mullins for her guidance throughout the writing process and for 
our shared enthusiasm on this topic. Finally, a special thanks to the editors of the FIU Law Review for 
publishing my note.  
1 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 474 (2012). 
2 Id. at 471. 
3 The Eighth Amendment right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions “flows from the basic 
‘precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned’” to the offender and 
the offense. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 
367 (1910)).  
4 See id. at 568. 
5 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010).  
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and mandatory LWOP for homicide offenses.6 However, the Court’s 
precedent does not outright preclude a juvenile offender from receiving 
lengthy term-of-years sentences for both homicide and non-homicide 
offenses.7 These lengthy term-of-years sentences can be likened to a death 
penalty or LWOP sentence because they place the juvenile’s first opportunity 
at release well beyond the age of retirement8 or, in more extreme instances, 
beyond the average life expectancy of the juvenile.9 In light of this similarity, 
these sentences effectively constitute de facto LWOP sentences.  
Responses in the lower courts to this issue of de facto LWOP sentences 
vary depending on a particular court’s construction of what the Court’s 
juvenile sentencing cases stand for and what they apply to. For instance, some 
state courts have held that Miller applies equally to LWOP and de facto 
LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders.10 These courts move beyond a strict 
interpretation of Miller and its predecessors, focusing instead on the spirit 
behind the “juveniles are different” mantra repeatedly espoused by the 
Court.11 However, other courts opt to interpret Miller strictly, and thereby see 
no problem imposing lengthy term-of-years sentences because such 
sentences do not have the LWOP label explicitly denied in Miller.12 
This note argues that de facto LWOP sentences13 pose constitutional 
concerns for juvenile offenders similar to those posed by a death penalty 
sentence or a LWOP sentence.14 For one, imposing de facto LWOP sentences 
seems to be at odds with the Supreme Court’s transition towards 
individualized sentencing consideration of the mitigating circumstances 
 
6 Miller, 567 U.S. at 479.  
7 See, e.g., United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 151–52 (3d Cir. 2018).  
8 “Full retirement age (also called ‘normal retirement age’) had been 65 for many years. 
However, beginning with people born in 1938 or later, that age gradually increases until it reaches 67 
for people born after 1959.” Retirement Age Calculator, SOC. SECURITY, 
https://www.ssa.gov/planners/retire/ageincrease.html.  
9 In 2017, life expectancy at birth was 78.6 for the entire U.S. population. This represents a 
decrease from 78.7 years in 2016. Sherry L. Murphy, Dr. Jiaquan Xu, Kenneth D. Kochanek & Dr. 
Elizabeth Arias, Mortality in the United States, 2017, NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 328 (Nov. 2018), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db328-h.pdf.  
10 See infra Part I (C).  
11 Id.  
12 Id.  
13 While no strict legal definition for a de facto life sentence exists, the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission defines the cutoff for de facto life at 470 months, just a few months shy of 40 years. GLENN 
R. SCHMITT & HYUN J. KONFRST, LIFE SENTENCES IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2015), 
https://www.ussc.gov/research/research-publications/life-sentences-federal-criminal-justice-system.  
14 Kelly Scavone, Note, How Long Is Too Long?: Conflicting State Responses to De Facto Life 
Without Parole Sentences After Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3439, 
3442 (2014).  
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surrounding youth.15 The Supreme Court seems to suggest that consideration 
of a juvenile’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change will 
rarely result in imposing harsh penalties such as LWOP.16 This, however, has 
not proven true with harsh penalties such as de facto LWOP sentences. 
Courts imposing de facto LWOP sentences seem to avoid the “basic thrust” 
of Roper, Graham, and Miller by refusing to recognize that the underlying 
rationale of the Supreme Court centers around individualized sentencing for 
juveniles, not the particular crime that juveniles commit.17  
Additionally, de facto LWOP sentences do not provide a juvenile 
offender “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,”18 in direct contradiction to the 
purpose behind the juvenile criminal system.19 Imprisoning juvenile 
offenders up until or past their life expectancy alters the remainder of his life 
“by a forfeiture that is irrevocable.”20 With a de facto LWOP sentence, a 
juvenile surrenders any “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.”21 
This note seeks to provide an explanation for why juveniles still receive 
de facto LWOP sentences in light of the Supreme Court’s rationale in Roper, 
Graham, and Miller directing sentencing authorities to take an individualized 
approach to juvenile sentencing and prohibiting the imposition of the harshest 
penalties on juveniles. The reason, this note argues, lies in the reality that 
sentencing procedures and policies fail to consider the Supreme Court’s 
observations regarding the rehabilitative nature of juveniles. First, all states 
have one or more transfer statutes providing for the transfer of juvenile 
offenders from state court to federal court.22 Once in federal court, the 
applicable sentencing guidelines and factors taken into account by the 
 
15 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (“Graham, Roper, and our individualized 
sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating 
circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”).  
16 Id. at 479 (“But given all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about children’s 
diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing 
juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”).  
17 See State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 72–73 (Iowa 2013).  
18 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010). 
19 Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 804–05 (2003) 
(“Two related claims were at the heart of the rehabilitative model of juvenile justice: that young offenders 
were misguided children rather than culpable wrongdoers, and that the sole purpose of state intervention 
was to promote their welfare through rehabilitation.”); Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of 
Development, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 143, 146 (2003) (“[T]he state could best address the resulting 
inappropriate conduct of these children through remedial rather than punitive measures.”). 
20 Miller, 567 U.S. at 474–75 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300–01 (1983)).  
21 Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.  
22 Anne Teigen, Juvenile Age of Jurisdiction and Transfer to Adult Court Laws, NAT’L CONF.  ST. 
LEGIS. (Jan. 11, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/juvenile-age-of-
jurisdiction-and-transfer-to-adult-court-laws.aspx. 
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sentencing authority fail to provide sufficient means for considering the 
juvenile’s age and other mitigating circumstances surrounding juvenile 
status.23 In an effort to resolve the discord among lower courts on the issue 
of de facto LWOP, this note proposes recommendations to bridge the gap 
between Supreme Court case law and sentencing factors. 
This note proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses how the Supreme 
Court has analyzed the prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment under 
the Eighth Amendment as applicable to juvenile sentencing. This section also 
details how the lower courts have responded to de facto LWOP for homicide 
and non-homicide juvenile offenders in light of the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Miller. Part II discusses sentencing procedures and statutes applicable to 
juveniles and how these policies facilitate the imposition of de facto LWOP 
sentences on juvenile offenders. Finally, Part III recommends statutory 
amendments and implementations aimed at eliminating the imposition of de 
facto LWOP sentences for juveniles. 
II. THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE SENTENCING UNDER THE 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT  
This part will provide an overview of the factors considered by the 
courts when conducting an Eighth Amendment analysis of juvenile 
sentencing, as well as the history and development of juvenile sentencing 
jurisprudence in the context of the Eighth Amendment. Finally, this part will 
introduce the problem faced by lower courts in trying to reconcile the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller and Graham with the imposition of de 
facto LWOP sentences on juvenile offenders.  
A. Constitutional Analysis of Punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment  
The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reads, “Excessive bail 
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”24 Central to understanding the scope of cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment are the concepts of 
proportionality and decency. 
A punishment violates the Eighth Amendment when it is “grossly 
disproportionate” to the crime committed.25 Punishment for crime should be 
graduated and proportioned to both the nature of the offense and the 
 
23 See infra Part III (B).   
24 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
25 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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characteristics of the offender.26 Generally, the Supreme Court’s cases 
addressing the proportionality of sentences fall within one of two 
classifications. The first classification involves challenges to the duration of 
a term-of-years sentence in light of all relevant circumstances in a particular 
case.27 This classification requires courts to compare the gravity of the 
offense and the severity of the sentence to determine if the sentence imposed 
is unconstitutionally excessive.28 The second classification involves placing 
categorical restrictions on the death penalty.29 This classification uses 
categorical rules to define Eighth Amendment standards, and considers both 
the nature of the offense and the characteristics of the offender.30 
Another factor considered in evaluating the constitutionality of 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment is the “evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”31 The Supreme Court 
has adopted the position that it is free to interpret the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause in accordance with current moral standards and is thereby 
not bound by the clause’s original meaning.32 These standards are measured 
by “objective factors to the maximum possible extent.”33 The factors 
primarily consist of legislative enactments and state practice,34 sentencing 
jury determinations,35 and the views of relevant expert entities.36 In addition 
to these factors, the Court employs its own independent judgement, as 
informed by its understanding of the Eighth Amendment’s text, history, 
meaning, and purpose.37 
 
26 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910). 
27 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010). 
28 Id. at 60 (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
29 Id. at 59.  
30 Id. at 60.  
31 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).  
32 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).  
33 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
34 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (describing state laws as “the clearest 
and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values.” Applying this standard, the Court in Atkins 
counted eighteen states that had abolished the death penalty for “mentally retarded” persons during the 
decade and a half following a controversial execution in Georgia in 1986. The Court also derived a 
consensus of contemporary value in the infrequency with which states permitting such executions actually 
carried them out.).  
35 Id. at 324 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
36 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (citing amici briefs from both the 
American Medical Association and the American Psychological Association, which stated that juveniles 
are more capable of change than are adults, and that their actions are less likely to be evidence of 
“irretrievably depraved character” than are the actions of adults).  
37 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008).  
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B. Juvenile Sentencing Jurisprudence 
Children have been classified differently under the law since the early 
1800s.38 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has developed a line of cases that has 
transformed the Eighth Amendment analysis of severe juvenile sentencing 
practices.39 At the core of each of the Court’s decisions is the understanding 
that “juveniles are different,” and this difference impacts the constitutionality 
of juvenile punishment.40  
1. Thompson v. Oklahoma: “Juveniles are Different” 
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of permissible sentences 
for juvenile offenders in Thompson v. Oklahoma.41 In this case, a fifteen-
year-old boy was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.42 
The Court held that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibited 
imposing the death penalty for juvenile offenders who were under the age of 
sixteen at the time they committed the offense.43 The Court reasoned that 
offenders under sixteen years of age have limited criminal culpability, as 
compared to their adult counterparts.44 The court noted that, as compared to 
adults, adolescents are more vulnerable, impulsive, and less self-
disciplined.45 Because of this, the Court determined that juveniles deserve 
less severe punishment because they innately have less capacity to control 
their conduct and think in term of long-range outcomes.46 Through its 
reasoning in Thompson, the Court highlighted the disproportionality present 
in sentencing juveniles with limited criminal culpability to the most severe 
sentencing possible.  
 
38 See Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 
1189–90 (1970). Early in American history, state law explicitly treated children under the age of seven 
differently because those below that age were believed to lack the maturity necessary to understand their 
criminal behavior.  
39 See generally Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
40 See, e.g., Miller, 567 U.S. at 483 (“[Y]outh matters for purposes of meting out the law’s most 
serious punishments.”).  
41 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
42 Id. at 818.  
43 Id. at 838.  
44 Id. at 833–34.  
45 Id. at 834.  
46 Id. at 835.  
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2. Roper v. Simmons’ Categorical Ban on Capital Punishment 
for Juvenile Offenders 
In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court expanded its ruling in 
Thompson by holding that the Eighth Amendment invalidated death 
sentences for offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes 
were committed.47 Christopher Simmons committed murder at the age of 
seventeen.48 Nine months later, after he had turned eighteen, Simmons was 
tried as an adult and sentenced to death.49 After the Supreme Court held that 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of a mentally 
retarded person,50 Simmons filed a petition for state postconviction relief. 
Simmons argued that the reasoning the court applied to find that the death 
penalty did not apply to the mentally retarded also applied to juveniles who 
committed their crimes while under the age of eighteen.51 The Supreme Court 
agreed.  
The Court supported its holding with an account of juvenile 
characteristics which fundamentally distinguish the mental state of juvenile 
offenders from that of adults committing the same crimes.52 First, the Court 
found that a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility 
are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable 
among the young.”53 Second, “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible 
to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”54 
Third, “the character of a juvenile is not as formed as that of an adult.”55 The 
Roper Court reasoned that these differences demonstrate that juveniles have 
a diminished capacity, making a death penalty sentence grossly 
disproportional to the juvenile’s culpability.56 As such, any penological 
justification for the death penalty applicable to adults must apply with lesser 
force to juveniles.57 
 
47 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
48 Id. at 556.  
49 Id. 
50 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).  
51 Roper, 543 U.S. at 559.  
52 Id. at 569–70.  
53 Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).  
54 Id. (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).  
55 Id. at 570 (citing ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968)).  
56 Id. at 572–73 (“The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well 
understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient 
culpability.”). 
57 Id. at 571 (The Court could not definitively determine whether capital punishment had a 
significant or measurable deterring or retributory effect on juveniles justifying its imposition at 
sentencing).  
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3. Graham v. Florida’s Categorical Ban on LWOP for Non-
Homicide Juvenile Offenders 
The Roper Court’s categorical ban of capital punishment for juveniles 
served as the basis for the Supreme Court’s ruling in Graham v. Florida, 
banning LWOP sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders.58 When he 
was sixteen years old, Terrance Graham attempted to rob a restaurant with 
three other school-age youths.59 During the attempted robbery, one of 
Graham’s accomplices struck the restaurant manager with a metal bar.60 
Graham was arrested for the robbery attempt and, at the election of the 
prosecutor, charged as an adult.61 Graham’s charges amounted to a first-
degree felony carrying a maximum penalty of LWOP, and a second-degree 
felony carrying a maximum penalty of fifteen years’ imprisonment.62 In 
exchange for a guilty plea, the sentencing court withheld adjudication of guilt 
and sentenced Graham to concurrent three-year terms of probation.63 Graham 
ultimately violated his probation when he became involved in another 
attempted robbery.64 The trial court, expressing its view that Graham was 
incorrigible and beyond the point of rehabilitation, sentenced him to the 
maximum sentence authorized under each felony charge.65 Graham 
challenged his sentenced under the Eighth Amendment.66 
The issue which most concerned the Graham Court with LWOP 
sentencing for juvenile offenders was the fact that nothing in Florida’s laws 
prevented its courts from sentencing non-homicide juveniles to LWOP based 
on a court’s subjective judgement that the juvenile offender is incorrigible 
and his actions demonstrate an “irretrievably depraved character.”67 The 
Court began its Eighth Amendment analysis of Graham’s LWOP sentence 
by noting that, as applied to juvenile offenders, LWOP sentences are 
 
58 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81–82 (2010).  
59 Id. at 53.  
60 Id.  
61 Id. (under Fla. Stat. § 985.227(1)(b), it was within a prosecutor’s discretion whether to charge 
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds as adults or juveniles or juveniles for most felony crimes). 
62 Id. at 53–54.  
63 Id. at 54.  
64 Id.  
65 Id. at 57 (“I don’t see where any further juvenile sanctions would be appropriate. I don’t see 
where any youthful offender sanctions would be appropriate . . . [I]t is apparent to the Court that you have 
decided that this is the way you are going to live your life.”).  
66 Id. at 52.  
67 Id. at 76 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)).  
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fundamentally analogous to capital punishment.68 Even though the state does 
not execute a juvenile sentenced to LWOP, the sentence irrevocably alters 
the offender’s life in the same way that a death penalty sentence does.69 A 
LWOP sentence deprives the individual of the “most basic liberties without 
giving hope of restoration.”70 The Court observed that imposing a LWOP 
sentence on a juvenile offender “means denial of hope; it means that good 
behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever 
the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will 
remain in prison for the rest of his days.”71 The Court also noted that recent 
developments in psychology and brain science continued to support a finding 
of fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds, including those 
differences discussed in both the Thompson and Roper decisions.72 In terms 
of the proportionality of a LWOP sentence for a non-homicide offender, the 
Court stated that “defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that 
life will be taken are categorically less deserving of the most serious forms 
of punishment than are murderers.”73 It follows then, that a juvenile offender 
who does not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished culpability.74  
The Court in Graham emphasized the ramifications of a LWOP 
sentence on any offender—ramifications that are only more pronounced in 
juveniles who ultimately spend more time incarcerated under a LWOP 
sentence because they are younger when sentenced.75 In considering the 
penological justifications typically associated with a LWOP sentence 
(retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), the Court noted 
that none proved sufficient to justify sentencing juvenile offenders to 
LWOP.76 In fact, the Court observed that imposing a LWOP sentence on a 
juvenile offender chipped away at these penological goals by refusing 
 
68 Id. at 69 (“It is true that a death sentence is ‘unique in its severity and irrevocability,’ . . . yet 
life without parole sentences share some characteristics with death sentences that are shared by no other 
sentences.”). 
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 69–70.  
71 Id. at 70.  
72 Id. at 68 (“No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court’s observations in Roper about 
the nature of juveniles.”).  
73 Id. at 69.  
74 Id.  
75 The State does not execute the offender sentenced to life without parole, but the sentence alters 
the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable. It deprives the convict of the most basic liberties 
without giving hope of restoration, except perhaps by executive clemency—the remote possibility 
of which does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence.  
Id. at 69–70. 
76 Id. at 71 (noting that LWOP sentences contradict the penological notion of rehabilitation when 
applied to juveniles because they are the group most receptive to and in need of rehabilitation).  
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juvenile offenders the chance to demonstrate growth and maturity.77 Thus, 
sentencing juveniles to LWOP without “any legitimate penological 
justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.”78 After Graham, 
juveniles cannot receive LWOP sentences for non-homicide offenses.79 
4. Miller v. Alabama’s Shift Towards Individualized 
Considerations of Age 
Two years after the Court’s decision in Graham, the Court addressed 
the issue of mandatory LWOP sentences imposed on juvenile homicide 
offenders.80 With this case, the Court shifted its focus from the actual penalty 
imposed on a juvenile to the means of imposing it. Roper and Graham placed 
categorial bans on certain punishments for juveniles. In Miller, the Court 
applied its previous observations of juvenile character traits from its holdings 
in Roper and Graham, noting that nothing previously said about children was 
crime-specific.81 The decision in Miller was based on two consolidated cases, 
each involving fourteen-year-olds tried and convicted as adults for murder 
and sentenced to a mandatory term of LWOP.82 In neither case did the 
sentencing authority have the power to depart from LWOP, as mandated by 
state law.83 In both cases, state law gave either the prosecutor or district 
attorney the discretion to charge juveniles as adults when they were alleged 
to have committed a serious offense, such as murder.84 Both juveniles 
challenged their sentences.85Applying its previous observations on the nature 
of juveniles, the Court held that before imposing a LWOP sentence on a 
juvenile homicide offender, sentencers must consider the offender’s youth 
and other attendant circumstances.86 The Court considered this ruling to flow 
naturally from its precedents, specifically the idea that youth matters for 
purposes of sentencing juveniles to the most severe sentences.87  
 
77 Id. at 74–75.  
78 Id. at 71.  
79 Id. at 82.  
80 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).  
81 By requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration without 
possibility of parole, regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the nature of their 
crimes, the mandatory-sentencing schemes before us violate this principle of proportionality, and so 
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 
Id. at 489. 
82 Id. at 465.  
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 466–68.  
85 Id. at 469.  
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 483.  
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In Miller, the Court’s major concern was the lack of discretionary 
consideration in mandatory sentencing schemes affecting juvenile homicide 
offenders.88 The Court held that by subjecting juveniles to the same 
mandatory sentencing schemes as adults, the laws prohibited a sentencing 
court from considering whether a LWOP sentence is proportionate 
punishment, in direct violation of the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality 
principle.89 Although the case at hand involved a mandatory LWOP sentence, 
the Court mentioned that youth is a mitigating factor that must always be 
used when considering severe sentences for juveniles. 90 As it did in Graham, 
the Court pointed out that juveniles sentenced under a mandatory scheme also 
used for adults will receive the same sentence as adults but will ultimately 
serve more time than their adult equivalents because they are younger when 
sentenced.91 Thus, in Miller the Court articulated the need for unique juvenile 
sentencing procedures. 
5. Montgomery v. Louisiana Expands the Reach of Miller  
In 1973, at the age of seventeen, Henry Montgomery killed a deputy 
sheriff in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.92 The court automatically sentenced 
Montgomery to LWOP upon the jury returning a verdict of “guilty without 
capital punishment.”93 Fifty years later, when the Supreme Court decided 
Miller, Montgomery sought collateral review of his mandatory life-without-
parole sentence.94  
The Court cited heavily to its reasoning in Miller: “Miller requires that 
before sentencing a juvenile to life without parole, the sentencing judge take 
into account ‘how children are different, and how those differences counsel 
against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.’”95 According to 
the Court, “Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law,” and is 
therefore retroactive because it carries a significant risk that the vast majority 
of juvenile offenders face punishments that the law cannot impose upon 
 
88 Id. at 476 (“Such mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account 
of an offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.”). 
89 Id. at 474.  
90 Id. at 489 (“[O]ur individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury must have 
the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for 
juveniles.”). 
91 Id. at 477.  
92 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 725 (2016).  
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 726. 
95 Id. at 733. 
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them.96 Thus, Miller’s holding requiring that sentencing courts consider the 
juvenile’s youth and its attendant characteristics applies retroactively to 
juveniles who received a mandatory LWOP sentence prior to the Court’s 
decision in Miller.   
6. The Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in the Case of Mathena 
v. Malvo 
On March 18, 2019, the Supreme Court agreed to decide whether its 
decision in Miller banning mandatory sentences of life without parole for 
juveniles can be used to upend discretionary life-without-parole sentences 
imposed on teens.97 Lee Boyd Malvo was one of the two snipers behind the 
Beltway sniper attacks in Washington, D.C.98 Between September 5, 2002, 
and October 22, 2002, Malvo and his accomplice murdered ten people and 
wounded numerous others.99 Malvo was seventeen at the time he committed 
these offenses for which he was sentenced to LWOP in 2004.100 Neither the 
court, prosecutor, nor Malvo’s counsel ever suggested that there was any 
possibility Malvo could be sentenced to anything less than LWOP.101 
Following Malvo’s convictions, the Supreme Court largely developed its 
Eighth Amendment juvenile sentencing jurisprudence.102 Following the 
Court’s decision in Miller, Malvo filed two federal habeas petitions seeking 
to vacate his LWOP sentences.103 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Miller is a substantive constitutional guarantee that applies regardless of 
whether the LWOP sentence was mandatorily imposed or discretionary.104 
The Fourth Circuit explained that under Miller, the Eighth Amendment bars 
LWOP sentences for all but those rare juvenile offenders whose crimes 
reflect permanent incorrigibility.105 The court determined Malvo was entitled 
to resentencing since the prior sentencing authority in Malvo’s case never 
 
96 Id. at 734.  
97 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Mathena v. Malvo, No. 18-217 (U.S. Aug. 16, 2018) 
[hereinafter Mathena Petition].  
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 4.  
100 Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 2, Mathena v. Malvo, No. 18-217 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2018) 
[hereinafter Malvo Opposition].  
101 Id. at 4.  
102 It was during this time that the Court handed down its decisions in Roper, Graham, and Miller.  
103 Malvo Opposition, supra note 100, at 6.  
104 Id. at 2.  
105 Id. at 9.  
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considered whether to impose a lesser sentence or whether Malvo’s crimes 
reflected irreparable corruption or permanent incorrigibility.106 
In his brief in opposition of writ of certiorari, Malvo argues that Eighth 
Amendment concerns surrounding a LWOP sentence imposed on a juvenile 
exist whether that juvenile is sentenced under a mandatory scheme or a 
discretionary scheme.107 Malvo relies on the Court’s reasoning in Miller, 
arguing that the reason the Court there invalidated the LWOP sentences was 
because the sentences failed to “distinguish juveniles whose crimes reflect 
the transient immaturity of youth from those whose crimes reflect irreparable 
corruption.”108 Mere discretion is not enough to combat this failure.109 The 
Eighth Amendment only permits imposing a LWOP sentence after the 
sentencer considers the juvenile offender’s “diminished culpability and 
heightened capacity for change” to determine if they are “the rare juvenile 
offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”110  
C. Reconciling Miller and Graham with the Imposition of De Facto 
LWOP Sentences on Juvenile Offenders.  
The Court’s decision in Graham placed a categorical ban on the practice 
of sentencing non-homicide juvenile offenders to LWOP. The Court’s 
decision in Miller held that a homicide juvenile offender cannot receive an 
automatic LWOP sentence without the sentencing authority first considering 
the juvenile’s age and the attendant circumstances surrounding his offense. 
However, to date, the Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed whether 
the reasoning behind Graham and Miller extends to juvenile offenders 
receiving discretionary sentences for a term of years that effectively 
constitutes LWOP. 111 However, the Court has now agreed to decide this issue 
by granting certiorari in the case of Mathena v. Malvo.112 
As Supreme Court case law on juvenile sentencing currently stands, 
courts still have the discretion to sentence juveniles to lengthy term-of-years 
sentences, effectively constituting a life sentence, in violation of the Eighth 
 
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 22.  
108 Id. 
109 Id.  
110 Id. (citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012).  
111 During oral arguments in Miller, the Court addressed lengthy sentences for juveniles as an 
emerging issue under the Eighth Amendment. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–5, Miller v. Alabama, 
576 U.S. 460 (2012) (No. 10-9646). “[O]nce you depart from the principle that we’ve enunciated that 
death is different, why is life without parole categorically different from 60 years or 70 years . . . ?” Id. at 
5. 
112 Mathena v. Malvo, No. 18-217, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 1905 (Mar. 18, 2019).  
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Amendment’s bar against disproportionate punishment. Although recent 
studies suggest a national consensus against the use of juvenile LWOP and 
highlight the consistency with which lower courts have responded to 
Miller,113 the fact remains that states are still imposing lengthy sentences that 
are the functional equivalent of a LWOP sentence. 
A number of lower courts have recognized that, given the Court’s 
emphasis on the characteristics of juveniles in Graham and its holding in 
Miller focusing on individual sentencing, lengthy or de facto life-without-
parole sentences violate the Eighth Amendment.114 In Budder v. Addison, the 
Tenth Circuit struck down a 155-year sentence consisting of three life-with-
parole sentences plus 20 years imposed on a juvenile non-homicide 
offender.115 The juvenile would have had to serve 131.75 years before 
becoming eligible for parole.116 Building off of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Graham, the Tenth Circuit held that the juvenile’s sentence denied him 
any real opportunity to obtain release, regardless of the label that the 
sentencing authority placed on the sentence.117 “In this context, there is no 
material distinction between a sentence for a term of years so lengthy that it 
“effectively denies the offender any material opportunity for parole” and one 
that will imprison him for “life without the opportunity for parole—both are 
equally irrevocable.”118 
Still, there are other federal courts that have adopted a narrower 
interpretation of the Court’s ruling in Miller and Graham, thereby upholding 
de facto life sentences for juveniles.119 For instance, two years after the 
 
113 See Brief for The Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race & the Justice & the Criminal 
Justice Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 12, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 
718 (2016) (No. 14-280) (arguing that a national consensus exists against sentencing juveniles to LWOP).  
114 See, e.g., McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that the sentencing court 
did not abide by the requirements set forth in Miller by sentencing a homicide juvenile offender to two 
consecutive 50-year prison terms without first considering how juveniles are different. The Seventh 
Circuit also held that the logic of Miller applies wherever a lengthy term of years sentence constitutes de 
facto LWOP); Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a cumulative sentence of 254 
years and a denial of parole for 127 years violates the Supreme Court’s holding in Graham because the 
juvenile will not be eligible for parole until well beyond his life expectancy).  
115 Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047, 1049 (10th Cir. 2017).  
116 Id. at 1050 (“Under Oklahoma law, a prisoner must serve 85% of his sentence before he will 
be eligible for parole.”). 
117 Id. at 1056 (reasoning that “[t]he Court in Graham focused, not on the label attached to the 
sentence, but on the irrevocability of the punishment.”).  
118 Id.  
119 See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 2016) (Juvenile defendant’s 
“600-month sentence does not fall within Miller’s categorical ban on mandatory life-without-parole 
sentences” because the juvenile was “resentenced under now-advisory federal guidelines after a hearing 
in which the district court carefully and thoroughly applied the teaching of Roper, Graham, and Miller.”); 
Davis v. McCollum, 798 F.3d 1317 (10th Cir. 2015); Croft v. Williams, 773 F.3d 170, 171 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(“[L]ife sentences for murder are discretionary under Illinois law. This is a critical difference from the 
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Supreme Court’s ruling in Graham, the Sixth Circuit held that a non-
homicide sixteen-year-old offender receiving a consecutive, fixed-term 
sentence of 89 years did not violate federal law.120 The Sixth Circuit held that 
neither the Supreme Court’s decision in Graham nor its decision in Miller 
applied to consecutive, fixed-term sentences for juveniles that had committed 
multiple non-homicide offenses.121 However, in so ruling, the Sixth Circuit 
overlooked the essence of the Supreme Court’s holding in Graham that 
juvenile offenders must be afforded some meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.122 Even the Sixth 
Circuit, in its holding, agrees that the juvenile offender’s 89-year sentence is 
the functional equivalent of life without parole.123 However, the court 
provides a technical interpretation of the Supreme Court’s holding in Graham 
to distinguish between a de facto life sentence and an actual life sentence.124 
By focusing so intently on the letter of the law, the Sixth Circuit disregarded 
the spirit of the law embodied in the Supreme Court’s Graham decision 
which centered on providing juvenile offenders with a meaningful chance at 
rehabilitation, regardless of the exact labeling of the juvenile’s sentence.  
III. EXPLAINING THE DISPARITY AMONG COURTS REGARDING 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JUVENILE DE FACTO LIFE 
SENTENCES 
This section will explain various factors arguably contributing to the 
existing circuit split regarding the constitutionality of sentencing juveniles to 
lengthy term-of-years sentences in which the possibility of parole occurs 
considerably past the juvenile’s average life expectancy.  
A. Automatic Transfer Laws Result in Adult Treatment of Juvenile 
Offenders  
One factor creating disparities in juvenile sentencing practices is 
automatic transfer statutes requiring that juveniles charged with certain 
offenses be transferred to adult court for sentencing. Transferring a juvenile’s 
case into adult court makes it possible for juveniles to receive mandatory 
 
situation presented in Miller, which considered only ‘mandatory life-without-parole sentences for 
juveniles.’”). 
120 Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 550 (6th Cir. 2012).  
121 Id. (“Graham is not clearly applicable to this case.”).  
122 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010). 
123 Bunch, 685 F.3d at 551.  
124 Id. (“[I]n Graham, the Court said that a juvenile is entitled to such a ‘realistic opportunity to 
obtain release’ if a state imposes a sentence of ‘life.’ . . . That did not happen in this case.”). 
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LWOP sentences because mandatory LWOP sentences are still permissible 
for adults. The transfers also make it more likely that a juvenile will receive 
a lengthy term-of-years sentence constituting a de facto LWOP sentence 
because sentencing authorities in adult courts will be less likely to consider 
age as a factor diminishing the applicable sentencing range.125 As of 2014, 
29 states had automatic transfer statutes and essentially all states allow judges 
to waive juveniles to the adult system.126 When juveniles are transferred to 
adult court, they are subject to mandatory sentencing schemes applicable to 
adults and are only afforded the sentencing considerations given to adult 
offenders.127 In light of this possibility, the Supreme Court’s precedent for 
juvenile sentencing, with the exception of the Court’s decision in Roper, is 
virtually without implementational force.128 
The ability to automatically transfer a juvenile’s case to adult court upon 
satisfaction of the transfer statute requirements undermines the Court’s 
holding in Miller calling for individualized considerations of a juvenile 
offender’s age and attendant circumstances. Discretionary transfer statutes 
placing the decision to transfer in the hands of the prosecutor or judge are 
also problematic, given that these statutes do not require transferring 
authorities to take the offender’s age into account when deciding to transfer, 
and usually, prosecutors are making the decision to transfer based solely off 
of the facts of the case.129 Whether automatic or discretionary, transfer 
statutes disregard a juvenile’s unique ability to rehabilitate.130 Once in adult 
court, the penological justifications typically inapplicable to a juvenile 
offender form the basis for the juvenile’s lengthy term-of-years sentence.131 
It is possible for juveniles to receive de facto LWOP sentence in adult court 
because the requirement that the juvenile receive a meaningful opportunity 
 
125 In Miller, Justice Kagan explained that states allowing juvenile LWOP sentences do so through 
“two independent statutory provisions,” one allowing the transfer of juvenile cases to adult court, the other 
setting general penalties applicable to all offenders tried in adult court. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 
485 (2012).  
126 CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, KEY FACTS: YOUTH IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (2012), 
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/KeyYouthCrimeFacts.pdf. 
127 Id. at 3; see also Charles Doyle, Cong. Research Serv., RL30822, Juvenile Delinquents and 
Federal Criminal Law: The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act and Related Matters 16 (2004) (“Juveniles 
transferred for trial as adults in federal court are essentially treated as adults, with few distinctions afforded 
or required because of their age.”).  
128 See 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a) (“A defendant who has been found guilty of [a capital offense] shall 
be sentenced to death if . . . it is determined that imposition of a sentence of death is justified, except that 
no person may be sentenced to death who was less than 18 years of age at the time of the offense.”). 
129 Miller, 567 U.S. at 487–88 (citing DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, P. GRIFFIN, S. ADDIE, B. ADAMS, & K. FIRESTINE, TRYING JUVENILES AS 
ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND REPORTING 5 (2011)). 
130 Ioana Tchoukleva, Note, Children Are Different: Bridging the Gap Between Rhetoric and 
Reality Post Miller v. Alabama, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 92, 94 (2013). 
131 Supra Part II (B).  
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for release espoused under Graham no longer applies in an adult court, where 
a juvenile is tried as an adult.132 
Additionally, it is possible that a juvenile in a particular state is 
automatically considered an adult for criminal justice purposes because they 
reached the statutorily defined age at which they are legally considered an 
adult.133 The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions—41 states and the 
District of Columbia—define age 17 as the oldest age that an individual can 
have a case originate in juvenile court.134 In two states, the youngest age at 
which a juvenile is considered an adult for criminal justice purposes is 15.135 
In those states, the juvenile’s trial originates in adult criminal court.136 
B. Sentencing Factors and Guidelines Fail to Adequately Account for 
Youth Characteristics Discussed in Supreme Court Cases  
Contributing to the disparity among courts in determining how to 
approach juvenile de facto LWOP sentencing is the fact the advisory 
sentencing guidelines, which sentencing courts are required to consult, 
provide relatively little to no recommendations pertinent to juvenile 
offenders. As explained below, once transferred to federal court, the 
recommendations applicable to juveniles fail to reflect both the spirit of the 
law as well as the transition towards individualized considerations of youth 
characteristics espoused in the Supreme Court’s juvenile sentencing cases.  
Sentencing authorities follow a three-step process when sentencing 
defendants. First, the court calculates the applicable guideline range and 
sentence enhancement by referring to the Sentencing Commission’s 
sentencing table.137 On one axis of the table is a range quantifying the 
seriousness of an offense, and on the other axis of the table is the offender’s 
 
132 See generally Patrick Griffin, Sean Addie, Benjamin Adams & Kathy Firestine, Trying 
Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer Laws and Reporting, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE 
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (September 2011), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434.pdf (discussing how juvenile offenders transferred to adult 
court face the possibility of receiving sentences decades longer that what they would have received in 
juvenile court).   
133 Nicole Scialabba, Should Juveniles Be Charged as Adults in the Criminal Justice System?, 
A.B.A. (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/childrens-
rights/articles/2016/should-juveniles-be-charged-as-adults/. 
134 Id.  
135 Id.  
136 Id.  
137 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1, 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/overview/Overview_Federal_Sentencing_Guidelines.p
df.  
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prior criminal history.138 The applicable sentencing range arises from the 
point at which the offense level intersects the offender’s criminal history 
classification.139 Second, the court considers motions to depart from the 
applicable sentencing range by assessing the sentencing guidelines and 
official commentary of the Commission.140 Third, the court considers the 
factors in Section 3553(a) of Title 18 of the United States Code.141 
When a defendant is convicted of a federal offense, the sentencing 
authority, although not bound to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, must 
consult and take them into account when sentencing a defendant.142 In 
Kimbrough v. United States, the Supreme Court held that sentencing courts 
are free to disregard the policies of the Guidelines and may find that a 
sentencing recommendation is “greater than necessary.”143 Thus, the 
Guidelines continue to stand as a required and fundamental starting point in 
federal sentencing.  
As pertaining to juveniles, relatively few sections from the Guidelines 
offer a sentencing court guidance with how to proceed in sentencing. Section 
5H1.12 provides that “[l]ack of guidance as a youth and similar 
circumstances indicating a disadvantaged upbringing are not relevant 
grounds in determining whether a departure is warranted.”144 This is due to 
the fact that the sentencing guidelines are crafted for adult offenders, not 
juveniles.145 However, as the Supreme Court has noted time and again, 
juveniles and adults are not the same and should not be treated the same for 
sentencing purposes. 146 Juveniles have a diminished culpability level and a 
heightened capacity for change.147 These capacities differ substantially from 
the capacities of adults.148  
Section 5H1.12 inherently discourages sentencing courts from 
considering a juvenile’s upbringing in determining whether to depart from 
the recommended sentencing range. This directly contravenes Miller, which 
 
138 FEDERAL SENTENCING TABLE, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-
manual/2016/Sentencing_Table.pdf. 
139 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 137, at 3. 
140 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2012). 
141 Id. § 3553(a)(1).  
142 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005). 
143 Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 110 (2007). 
144 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.12 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).  
145 Note, Mending the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Approach to Consideration of Juvenile 
Status, 130 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1010 (2017).  
146 See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012). 
147 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010); see also Miller, 567 U.S. at 460.  
148 Emily Steiner, Mandatory Minimums, Maximum Consequences, JUV. L. CTR. (Aug. 17, 2017), 
https://jlc.org/news/mandatory-minimums-maximum-consequences.  
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required an individualized consideration of a juvenile’s characteristics.149 
The Court in Miller implicitly touched upon the juvenile offender’s lack of 
guidance in discussing and referencing back to the child’s upbringing in its 
holding.150 Therefore, Miller’s lack of guidance as a youth factored into the 
Court’s analysis of his sentence.  
Even more problematic is the Commission’s Departure and Variance 
Primer, explicitly stating that, “[a] defendant’s guideline sentence is to be 
based on the offense the defendant committed, not the character of the 
defendant.”151 This runs contrary to the notion espoused by the Supreme 
Court that “juveniles are different.”152 Thus, the Commission’s failure to 
advise sentencing courts to consider a juvenile defendant’s character 
disregards the Court’s transition towards individualized considerations of age 
and other attendant circumstances as espoused in Miller. 
The Commission’s only other age-related guidance is found in Section 
5K2.22 of the Guidelines and is limited in its application to sentencing for a 
defendant convicted of an offense involving a minor victim.153 Section 
5K2.22(1) provides that the defendant’s age may be reason to depart 
downwards from the applicable sentencing range to the extent permitted by 
Section 5H1.1.154 However, as discussed above, the Commission discourages 
consideration of age as a mitigating factor under Section 5H1.1.155  
The Commission’s policy statements discouraging the consideration of 
age further complicate juvenile sentencing when considering the statutory 
requirement under 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) that sentencing judges consider 
all relevant characteristics of an offender.156 Section 3553(a) is a catch-all 
provision providing for consideration of numerous factors, including: “the 
 
149 See, e.g., Miller, 567 U.S. at 460. 
150 Id. at 479 (“Miller’s stepfather physically abused him; his alcoholic and drug-addicted mother 
neglected him; he had been in and out of foster care as a result; and he had tried to kill himself four times, 
the first when he should have been in kindergarten.”).  
151 OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DEPARTURE AND VARIANCE PRIMER 
31 (2013), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2014_Primer_Departure_Variance.pdf 
(discouraging consideration of age under §5H.1. of the Guidelines).  
152 See supra Part II (B).  
153 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.22 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 
154 Id. at § 5K2.22(1).  
155 Section 5H1.1 of the Guidelines provides that age “may be relevant in determining whether a 
departure is warranted, if considerations based on age, individually or in combination with other offender 
characteristics, are present to an unusual degree and distinguish the case from the typical cases covered 
by the guidelines.” However, the Commission does not explain what constitutes an unusual degree 
warranting consideration of age.  
156 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).  
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need for the sentence imposed,”157 “the kinds of sentences available,”158 “the 
need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense,”159 and “the nature 
and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 
defendant.”160 It follows, logically, that age would be one such characteristic 
that the court is required to consider.161 However, Congress failed to define 
under Section 3553 what exactly constitutes the “characteristics of the 
defendant.”162  
The disparity between Supreme Court precedent urging consideration of 
youth and the Guidelines discouraging consideration of the offender’s youth 
and other attendant circumstances contributes to the existing circuit splits 
regarding the constitutionality of de facto LWOP sentences for juvenile 
offenders. As demonstrated above, the Guidelines are ambivalent in their 
treatment of juvenile and adult offenders, affording both groups the same 
considerations when determining whether to reduce an applicable sentencing 
range. However, the penological goals applicable to adult offenders, which 
the Guidelines take into account, are not applicable to juvenile offenders who 
lack the level of moral culpability that an adult offender possesses and who 
demonstrate a greater rehabilitation capability than their adult counterparts. 
163 Because the Commission discourages consideration of youth 
characteristics, courts analyzing lengthy juvenile terms often are left to apply 
strict interpretations of the guidelines and Supreme Court precedent.164 
As discussed, the Commission’s Guidelines for sentencing and transfer 
statutes removing juvenile offenders from juvenile to adult court systems do 
not preclude the possibility that a juvenile offender receive a sentence 
extending well beyond average life expectancy. Rather, they facilitate the 
 
157 Id. § 3553(a)(2). 
158 Id. § 3553(a)(3).  
159 Id. § 3553(a)(7). 
160 Id. § 3553(a)(1). 
161 The Supreme Court’s precedent in Roper, Miller, and Graham suggest that an offender’s 
juvenile status is a characteristic that sentencing courts must consider. This is evidenced in the Court’s 
observations of general characteristics pertaining to all juveniles.  
162 Note, supra note 145, at 1011. 
163 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 461 (2012) (“[D]istinctive attributes of youth diminish 
the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they 
commit terrible crimes.”); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74–75 (2010); see also Note, supra note 145, 
at 1012 (“A court applying the Guidelines without considering ratcheting a sentence down based on youth 
applies a system premised on the sufficient and necessary penological purposes of sentencing the typical 
offender: an adult.”).  
164 See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 2016) (interpreting the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Miller as constituting a categorical ban on Mandatory LWOP sentences while 
disregarding the Court’s larger holding that sentencing courts must take into account a juvenile’s age and 
other attendant circumstances prior to receiving a LWOP sentence). 
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imposition of such sentences because the sentencing courts are not assessing 
the juvenile’s youth characteristics when determining sentences.165  
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
With its decision in Miller, the Supreme Court took juvenile sentencing 
in a new direction by holding that juvenile offenders have a right to have their 
age taken into consideration before being sentenced to LWOP. However, as 
discussed in the preceding section, lower courts encounter difficulty 
reconciling the Court’s holding in Miller with the Guidelines and transfer 
statutes which both discourage consideration of an offender’s age and treat 
juveniles as adults with the same aptitude for moral culpability. The result of 
sentencing courts attempting to reconcile these two factors is that juveniles 
receive lengthy term-of-years sentences placing their first opportunity of 
release well beyond the average life expectancy. What follows are 
suggestions and recommendations that would ensure sentencing courts apply 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning when examining the Guidelines and statutory 
provisions for juvenile sentencing.  
A. Extending Graham’s Analysis of Penological Goals to De Facto 
LWOP Sentences 
In Graham, the Supreme Court largely based its decision to 
categorically ban LWOP sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders by 
reasoning that the penological goals typically served by such a sentence did 
not apply to juvenile offenders with the same force with which they applied 
to adults.166 The Court’s considerations regarding the applicability of the 
penological goals to juvenile offenders was not crime specific and centered 
more on the nature of juveniles as well as the nature of a LWOP sentence. 
These elements are both present in instances where juveniles are sentenced 
to lengthy term-of-years sentences effectively constituting LWOP, but for 
their label.  
Extending the Court’s assessment of the penological goals to analyze 
potential justifications for de facto LWOP sentences renders them 
unconstitutional in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Lengthy sentencing 
terms which place a juvenile’s first opportunity at release well beyond 
 
165 See Note, supra note 145, at 1012 (“The resultant sentence for a youth offender convicted as 
an adult then is likely ‘greater than necessary’ under § 3553(a) when youth status is not accounted for.”). 
166 Graham, 560 U.S. at 70–71.  
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average life expectancy are incompatible with the goals of retribution, 
deterrence, and incapacitation.167  
The Court in Graham held that the goal of retribution is based on the 
idea that a “criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal 
culpability of the criminal offender.”168 Society is entitled to impose severe 
sanctions on a criminal offender to express its condemnation of the crime and 
seek restoration of the moral imbalance brought about by the crime.169 
However, sentencing a juvenile to a term effectively constituting LWOP 
cannot be said to be proportional to the juvenile’s personal culpability when, 
as the Court acknowledges, juveniles have a diminished moral culpability.170 
The case for this argument is stronger in instances where juveniles 
committing non-homicide offenses are sentenced to de facto LWOP. In those 
cases, there is a proportionality concern triggering Eighth Amendment 
considerations that a virtual LWOP sentence constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment.  
The Court in Graham did not believe that the penological justification 
of deterrence justified LWOP for juvenile offenders, and its reasoning for so 
believing also applies to de facto LWOP sentences.171 The deterrence 
justification is effective when individuals are capable of taking into account 
possible punishment. However, this is not the case with juveniles who “lack 
maturity” and have “an underdeveloped sense of responsibility” and are 
therefore more likely to engage in poor decision-making.172 Thus, punishing 
a juvenile under the penological justification of deterrence through a LWOP 
sentence or a sentence effectively constituting LWOP is grossly 
disproportional to a juvenile offender’s ability to make responsible decisions.  
Incapacitation is yet another penological goal that cannot be justified 
under either a LWOP sentence or a de facto LWOP sentence.173 The purpose 
of the incapacitation goal is to segregate individuals who repeatedly commit 
criminal offenses from the rest of society for an extended period of time.174 
As the Court noted in Graham, the characteristics associated with youth make 
incapacitation a questionable justification for sentencing juveniles to life 
 
167 Id. at 71. 
168 Id.  
169 Id.  
170 Id. at 71–72. 
171 Id. at 72 (“[T]he same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest . . . 
that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.”). 
172 Id. 
173 Id. (“To justify life without parole on the assumption that the juvenile offender forever will be 
a danger to society requires the sentencer to make a judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible.”).  
174 Id.  
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sentences, whether explicitly or implicitly. This is due to the difficulty in 
assessing the level of risk a juvenile offender poses to society.175 
Finally, rehabilitation is a penological goal, which, in the case of 
juveniles, is best served outside of incarceration. The Court defines 
Rehabilitation as the right to reenter society.176 By sentencing juveniles to 
LWOP or de facto LWOP, courts are denying juveniles the right to a 
meaningful opportunity for release. In the case of de facto LWOP, an 
offender’s first opportunity for release often comes at a point when the 
juvenile is beyond the age of retirement or the average life expectancy. In 
Graham, the Court noted that defendants serving LWOP sentences are often 
denied access to vocational training and other rehabilitative services.177  
Thus, by assessing the extent to which the traditional penological 
justifications apply to a juvenile offender, sentencing courts can ensure that 
the sentence imposed on a juvenile comports with the Supreme Court’s 
observations regarding the juvenile’s unique nature.  
B. Adopt Additional Sentencing Factor Considerations; Define Those 
Factors Which Are Ambiguous 
Sentencing courts are required to consider the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 
Section 3553(a) in imposing a sentence. The factors listed include the 
characteristics of the defendant. However, Congress has failed to provide any 
further explanation as to which specific aspects of the defendant’s 
characteristics must be considered.178 As discussed above, this ambiguity 
makes virtual LWOP for juveniles possible because sentencing courts are not 
provided with a clear indication of the factors they must consider pertaining 
to an offender’s age. As such, the factors fail to account for the Supreme 
Court’s focus on the unique nature of juvenile offenders and how that nature 
should be taken into account at sentencing. 
The Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. Grant recommending 
two new factors for sentencing courts to consider, in addition to the Section 
3553(a) factors, is a step in the right direction: first, courts must calculate the 
juvenile’s average life expectancy, and, second, courts must shape a sentence 
that properly accounts for a “meaningful opportunity for release.”179 In 1992, 
sixteen-year-old Grant was convicted of conspiracy and racketeering under 
 
175 Id. at 73.  
176 Id. at 74.  
177 Id. (“For juvenile offenders, who are most in need of and receptive to rehabilitation . . . the 
absence of rehabilitative opportunities or treatment makes the disproportionality of the sentence all the 
more evident.”).  
178 See Note, supra note 145. 
179 United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 148–49 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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the RICO Act, as well as various drug trafficking charges and a gun charge. 
At sentencing, the district court, in its own discretion, determined that Grant 
would never be fit to reenter society and therefore sentenced him to life in 
prison without the possibility of parole.180 At resentencing, in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Miller, the district court determined that Grant’s 
upbringing and debilitating characteristics of youth demonstrated his 
capacity to reform, thereby making a LWOP sentence inappropriate.181 
Instead of a LWOP sentence, the District Court now sentenced Grant to sixty-
five years without parole.182 On appeal, Grant argued that his sentence 
constituted a de facto LWOP because his earliest opportunity for release is at 
age seventy-two, the same age as his life expectancy. 183 
The Third Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the 
imposition of a term-of-years sentence lasting for the duration of a juvenile’s 
life expectancy, particularly in instances where the juvenile’s crimes 
demonstrate immaturity rather than irreparable corruption. In so holding, the 
court instructed sentencing courts to first conduct individualized evidentiary 
hearings to determine the juvenile’s life expectancy and whether there exists 
within the applicable sentence a meaningful opportunity for release.184 The 
Third Circuit reasoned that, by considering the juvenile’s average life 
expectancy, courts prevent sentencing juveniles that are capable of reform to 
a term of years that denies them a meaningful opportunity at release.185 
The Third Circuit also required that sentencing courts assess whether 
there exists a meaningful opportunity for release.186 In order to do this, the 
court recommends considering the age of retirement as a sentencing factor 
for juveniles determined to be capable of reform.187 According to the court, 
the age of retirement constitutes a transitional life stage where an individual 
permanently leaves the work force after contributing to society over the 
course of their work life.188 The court defined a meaningful opportunity for 
release stating, “a non-incorrigible juvenile offender must be afforded an 
opportunity for release at a point in his or her life that still affords ‘fulfillment 
outside prison walls,’ ‘reconciliation with society,’ ‘hope,’ and ‘the 
opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of human 
 
180 Id. at 136.  
181 Id. at 136–37.  
182 Id. at 137.  
183 Id. at 142.  
184 Id. at 144–45.  
185 Id. at 148.  
186 Id. at 147. 
187 Id. at 150. 
188 Id.  
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worth and potential.’”189 A sentence preserving the juvenile’s ability to 
contribute productively to society by placing the point of release prior to the 
age of retirement allows a juvenile to accomplish all of this.  
The Grant court noted that they were bound by the Supreme Court’s 
mandate and that juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect “transient 
immaturity of youth” had a right to a meaningful opportunity for release.190 
Sentencing Courts should follow the same analysis laid out by the Third 
Circuit in Grant because the court’s analysis there comported with the 
Supreme Court’s observations regarding the nature and characteristics of 
juveniles.191 Considering the juvenile’s average life expectancy and whether 
a sentence affords the juvenile a meaningful opportunity for release fills the 
gaps left by the sentencing guidelines and factors, which, as explained above, 
fail to adequately take into account a juvenile’s youth and attendant 
circumstances.  
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Supreme Court’s juvenile sentencing cases ensure that a juvenile 
offender’s sentence does not run afoul of the Eighth Amendment, to a certain 
extent. Currently, the Court’s precedent does not outright preclude juvenile 
offenders from receiving lengthy term-of-years sentences for both homicide 
and non-homicide offenses. These lengthy sentences are the clear equivalent 
of a LWOP sentence because they place the juvenile’s first opportunity at 
release well beyond the age of retirement or, in more extreme instances, 
beyond average life expectancy. With a de facto LWOP sentence, a juvenile 
is not afforded a meaningful opportunity for release. Under the Eighth 
Amendment, this punishment is disproportionate to that which such an 
immature and vulnerable class as juveniles can be deemed to deserve.  
Lower courts are split on the issue of whether a de facto LWOP sentence 
violates the Eighth Amendment. This discord among the courts can be 
attributed to the lack of guidance sentencing courts receive when sentencing 
juveniles. Once a juvenile is transferred to federal court, the applicable 
sentencing guidelines and factors that the sentencing authority considers fail 
to provide sufficient means through which to account for the juvenile’s age 
and other mitigating circumstances surrounding juvenile status. Thus, the 
sentencing factors and guidelines applicable to juveniles in federal court do 
not comport with Supreme Court precedent. This deficiency provides the 
 
189 Id. at 147 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010)).  
190 Id. at 148. 
191 Id. (“[W]e elect to fashion a principled legal framework that carries out the Supreme Court’s 
holdings but goes no further.”).  
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grounds for courts to view the constitutionality of de facto LWOP sentences 
differently. One sentencing court following the strictest interpretation of the 
Supreme Court’s holdings and abiding by the limited sentencing guidelines 
and factors may find that a de facto LWOP sentence does not violate the 
Eighth Amendment. However, another sentencing court recognizing the 
importance of the reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s holdings and the 
inability of the sentencing guidelines and factors to account for the mitigating 
circumstances of youth may find a de facto LWOP sentence unconstitutional.  
In an effort to resolve this disparity, sentencing courts should engage in 
an analysis of the traditional penological justifications applicable to juvenile 
offenders. This analysis would enable courts to ensure that the imposed 
sentence comports with the Supreme Court’s observations regarding the 
unique characteristics of juveniles. Additionally, sentencing courts should 
mirror the Third Circuit’s approach to juvenile de facto LWOP sentences by 
considering, in addition to the sentencing guidelines and factors, the 
juvenile’s average life expectancy and whether a proposed sentence affords 
the juvenile a meaningful opportunity for release.  
 
